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Abstract  
The withdrawal of UK from the European Union (EU) will have damaging impacts 
not only on the UK’s economy, but also on the economies of its European trade partners. 
The Brexit long-term impacts are still unclear, however the short-term effects are still 
affecting the both European and British economies due to the uncertainty felt by the 
investors, disturbing its confidence and making them to reschedule their investment 
decisions. Brexit raises questions about the future stability of the EU, but the extent of its 
effects will depend on the terms of negotiations between the two parts concerning the future 
trading relationships and the UK financial obligations to the EU. The majority of the studies 
about Brexit focus on the UK side, disregarding the impacts that British decision will have 
on European countries. Thus, to fill this gap, this analysis will centre on the perception of 
Portuguese Textile & Apparel managers and agents about the expected impacts of Brexit. 
Based on a survey to a sample of 2.238 companies, to which answered 91 companies, results 
indicate that the majority of Portuguese Textile & Apparel managers present a negative 
perspective about the potential impacts on Portuguese trade relationship with the UK, being 
the companies with a high UK market share the most pessimistic ones. 
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1. Introduction 
 On March 29, 2017, United Kingdom (UK) has officially announced the leaving from 
the European Union (EU), after the referendum on June 23, 2016, where UK’s population 
voted “YES” to Brexit, having two years to effectively leave the EU (following the Article 
50 of the EU Treaty).  
 As a member of the European Union, the UK has access to the Single Market, which 
is defined by the European Commission as “the EU as one territory without any internal borders or 
other regulatory obstacles to the free movement of goods and services” (European Commission, 2017a). 
However, with the withdrawal, UK can lose the access to the Single Market, in a scenario of 
“Hard Brexit”, where no trade deals are achieved and new tariffs to trade are imposed. Other 
softer scenarios, such as a Norway or Switzerland model, are possible outcomes, depending 
on the terms of negotiations reached by the two parts (Dhingra et al., 2017a). In addition, 
according to Crafts (2016), the European Movement International (2016) and Kierzenkowski 
et al. (2016), belonging to the Single Market makes the UK more attractive in terms of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) inflows. Thus, UK could, in a near future, get less FDI inflows, 
mainly from the European countries. 
 This overall situation assumes a huge importance, since UK represents an important 
market share of the exports of several EU countries, and vice-versa. In 2016, the EU exports 
of goods to the UK reached an amount of €293 billion, while the EU imports from the UK 
represented a smaller amount of €176 billion (Pordata, 2016a). Thus, we accomplish that UK 
has a large deficit on the trade in goods with EU. This deficit is reflected on all EU members, 
with the exception of Ireland (Lawless and Morgenroth, 2016). Concerning the trade in 
services, in 2016, we realize that EU exports €88 billion in services to UK, while importing 
from UK an amount of €117 billion (Pordata, 2016a). In the case of Portugal, the volumes 
of trade are lower when comparing to Germany or France, however they assume in the same 
way high significance. In 2016, in terms of goods, Portuguese exports to the UK were €3,531 
million (weighting 7% on the total exports), while imports reached €1,877 million, 
representing 3% of the Portuguese imports (Comtrade, 2016a). Thus, the United Kingdom 
assumes the 4th position on Portuguese exports, while goes down to the 6th position when 
we consider the countries which Portugal imports from. Regarding the services, according 
to Comtrade (2016b), in 2016, Portugal exports €3,945 million (15% of total service exports), 
and imports from the UK €1,411 million (almost 11% of total imports of services). Hence, 
Portugal presents a positive commercial balance with the UK on both goods and services.  
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 Accordingly, those countries for which UK represents a high market share on trade, 
for instance Germany, Portugal, France, Spain, among others, will have strong incentives to 
apply for a Soft Brexit, in order to avoid the imposition of tariffs and regulations on trade, 
which would imply costs and delays. On the other side, the Central, Eastern and Southeast 
European members, which weight of UK exports does not highly affect their economy, may 
not agree with similar rights for a country that does not want to remain as a member of the 
EU and continue to benefit from the advantages of belonging to the Single Market (Begg, 
2017). Moreover, according to Lawless & Morgenrath (2016), the impacts of Brexit will not 
be similar on all EU members, it will depend on the amount of UK trade share as well as on 
the type of products traded and the elasticity of price changes, because in the worst scenario, 
the products would face different tariffs, which can vary from 0% to more than 80%. 
Countries that exports products with high tariffs and high elasticity would fell extremely the 
Brexit effects (Lawless & Morgenrath, 2016). 
 Additionally, UK showed its intention to trade with non-EU countries, and outside 
of the Single Market, UK may search for different suppliers, such as China and US. China 
has been increasing its share on the UK’s imports, and Brexit can foment even more this 
relationship. Some studies predict that “by 2035, China is the UK’s second largest export market 
(ahead Germany) and India has become number seven (ahead Spain and Italy)” (Slater, 2016, p.16). 
Hence, European companies, which are dependent of the British market can lose potential 
clients to third countries. Moreover, these companies have already been affected on the short 
term, as on the day after the Brexit announcement the pound lost around 15% of its value 
towards Euro (around 15%) (Begg, 2017). 
As Brexit is a recent topic, studies about its impact are relatively scarce. Besides, the 
few existing studies and investigations focus mainly on the UK side, neglecting the 
importance that the effects of Brexit may have on the European Union. The few exceptions 
are recent investigations about Germany and France (Bouoiyour & Selmi, 2016), Romania 
(Stanciu, 2017), Ireland ((Bergin et al., 2016) and (Vega, Espino and Valero (2018)), and 
Germany (Nothnagel and Heidenreich, 2017). In this way, the key goal of this research is to 
gauge which are the expected impacts of Brexit on Portugal. The study aims to explore the 
Portuguese managers and agents’ perception about the potential impacts of Brexit on 
Portugal, focusing on the Textile and Apparel sector, due to its crucial prominence to 
Portugal in terms of employability and GDP’s contribution. According to Pordata (2016b), 
these sectors represent almost 11% of Portuguese exports in terms of goods, employing 210 
thousand persons (Pordata, 2016c), which represents almost 5% of the total population 
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employed at full-time in Portugal. Furthermore, the Textile sector is the third most important 
sector in terms of Portuguese exports to the British market. Lawless and Morgenroth (2016), 
and Black (2017) did an analysis to the sectors which can be more affected by the Brexit and 
found that, in a Hard Brexit scenario, the textiles will be hardly affected by high tariffs. In 
this way, this research will offer important information to the Portuguese companies, helping 
them preparing to face the adverse consequences of UK’s decision and to develop 
appropriate strategic responses.  
Hence, a similar approach to the one driven by Nothnagel and Heidenreich (2017) 
about Germany, which focused on an online survey conducted to Germany companies will 
be followed: we will implement a survey to be completed by Portuguese Textile managers in 
order to study their expectation about the future impacts of Brexit on Portuguese economy. 
This survey will be complemented by two interviews to a Portuguese and British Textile 
Agent, which will follow the same topics of the survey.  
 The present work is divided in 5 chapters, besides the introduction part. It starts by 
presenting a literature review (Chapter 2). Further, it is studied the trade evolution between 
Portugal and the UK and the principal sectors traded (Chapter 3), followed by a description 
of the methodology process (Chapter 4), and the results description and discussion 
(Chapter 5). Finally, it is presented the conclusions, limitations and further implications of 
this research (Chapter 6).  
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2. Literature Review  
This chapter is divided into 4 sections. The diverse levels of economic integration 
are, firstly, defined and the UK position on the EU is contextualized (Section 2.1). On 
Section 2.2, it is explored the benefits that the UK obtains from belonging to the EU 
membership, contrasting with the costs incurred, in order to find if being a member or a 
withdrawal is the most favourable decision. On Section 2.3, it is addressed the possible 
scenarios for the future UK-EU relationship after Brexit, defining the features of each 
alternative and the losses that each involves. Finally, section 2.4 analyses similar studies done 
to other European countries.  
 
2.1.  Integration concepts 
Become a member of the European Union is a long and complex process that 
involves a gradual integration of the country by following the specific conditions imposed in 
order to assure a smooth and successful economic convergence. Thus, there are different 
levels of integration, namely the Free Trade Area (FTA), the Customs Union, the European 
Single Market and the Monetary Union.  
According to European Commission (2017b), the Free Trade Area involves an 
agreement between the countries, where the customs barriers and commercial regulations 
are eliminated. However, each country maintains their own customs regulation and trade 
relationship with third countries.  
The Customs Union is defined by the European Commission (2017c) as “countries 
apply a uniform system for handling the import, export and transit of goods and implement a common set of 
rules called the Union Customs Code (UCC). A uniform system of customs duties is being used on imports 
from outside the EU and there are no customs duties at the borders between the EU countries”. In sum, 
belonging to the EU Customs Union allows the EU members to trade with each other 
without any trade barriers or custom control, however they are not freely allowed to trade 
with non-EU countries (Goodwin, 2017). 
The European Single Market allows the free movement of people, goods and services 
between all the members, stimulating the trade, competition, and economic growth and 
improving the efficiency of trade. Moreover, according to the European Commission, 
“Thanks to the abolition of border controls between EU countries, people can travel freely throughout most 
of the continent. And it has become much easier to live, work and travel abroad in Europe. Every member 
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country must treat EU citizens in exactly the same way as its own citizens for employment, social security 
and tax purposes” (European Commission, 2017a).  
 Finally, the Monetary Union promotes the integration and cohesion between all 
members, with more than 340 million EU citizens in 19 countries using the Euro as their 
currency (European Commission, 2017d). According to Rehn (2014) a single currency brings 
many advantages, as it promotes price stability, and consequently, a stable inflation rate, 
eliminates the transaction costs and the exchange rate risk, and stimulates the economic 
growth. The monetary union is more practical and advantageous for the citizens who travel 
around the Euro area, making the prices more transparent and a more stable price protects 
their purchasing power (Rehn, 2014).  
Furthermore, the 28 EU members belong to the European Single Market, although 
they are not obligated to belong to the Monetary Union, as happens with the UK.   
  
2.2.  The EU membership with the UK 
 In 1973, the UK becomes a member of the EU, doubling its GDP per capita 
(Kierzenkowski et al., 2016). In line with Crafts (2016, p.12), “when the UK entered the EU in 
1973 it was after a period of serious underperformance in economic growth which had seen income and 
productivity levels fall behind France and Germany”. The UK has recovered its economy recession 
when joined the EU, which allowed the liberalization and increase of trade and a more 
competitive UK’s performance in terms of productivity. After the mid-1990’s, UK growth 
was higher than France and Germany. Crafts (2016) also suggests that if UK had continued 
outside the EU, it probably would remain with an economic growth behind France and 
Germany. 
 This membership presents benefits as well as costs, so it is crucial to make a cost-
benefit analysis (summarized on the Table 1) to understand if the exit from this membership 
will generate positive or negative impacts to the UK economy. 
 
Table 1 - Cost-benefit analysis of the EU-UK membership 
BENEFITS COSTS 
 Free access to Single Market  No control over immigration, but immigration has a 
strong impact on the labour force.  
FDI attractiveness 
 
Common Agricultural Policy unfavourable to the UK: 
higher prices paid by agricultural goods. 
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 EU budget contribution: max. £280 million per week. 
 
Brexit supporters claim for demanding EU regulations. 
TOTAL: 8,6% - 10,6% of UK GDP 1,4% of UK GDP 
Source: Own elaboration based on Crafts (2016, p.9) 
 Starting with the benefits, the main advantage of being a member of the EU is the 
free access to the Single Market, allowing the trade between all members without any trade 
barrier or cost, fomenting the increase and improvement of commercial transactions. 
Moreover, following Kierzenkowski et al. (2016), Crafts (2016) and the European Movement 
International (2016), the EU membership stimulates the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
attractiveness. According to these authors, FDI inflows have strong and crucial impacts on 
the economy, since foreign investments encourages the advance of new ideas/knowledge 
and innovation, and consequently, the improvement on productivity and export capacity. 
Thus, FDI allows a country to rise its production capacity, becoming more competitive and 
being able to practice more competitive prices. The FDI inflows also affect positively the 
managerial quality as well as the organizational efficiency. The larger are the FDI inflows, the 
greater is the trade integration between UK and EU, and stronger is the relationship between 
them (Kierzenkowski et al., 2016). However, with the exit of UK from EU, the UK become 
less attractive to European Union continue investing high amounts, i.e, the UK will receive 
lower FDI inflows from EU members.  
 On the other hand, European Union Member States support the “Membership Fee”, 
which not only include monetary costs, but also some constraints and regulations that all 
members have to follow. Firstly, UK has no control over the immigration from the European 
countries. According to Crafts (2016, p.8), “the stock of European Economic Area (EEA) 
immigrants in the UK rose from 0.9 to 2.8 million between 1995 and 2011 of whom 0.4 million were 
employed in 1995 and 1.5 million in 2011”. Having no control over this key issue has promoted 
the Brexit decision, since one of the UK’s goal with the exit from the EU is to restrict and 
impose tighter controls to immigrants (Kierzenkowski et al., 2016). However, immigration 
has a strong impact on the domestic labour force, as between 2001 and 2011, the EEA 
immigrants gave a net fiscal contribution of almost £29 billion (Craft, 2016). So, apparently, 
immigration does not seem to represent a real cost to the UK. Secondly, the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been unfavourable to the UK, since it presents a small 
agricultural sector, and EU producers impose higher prices to British consumers (Crafts, 
2016). Another component of this fee is the UK’s contribution to the EU budget, which UK 
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will partial or totally save with Brexit. The real contribution from UK to EU is between 0.3% 
and 0.7% of GDP, representing a maximum of £280 million per week (Begg, 2017). 
According also to this author, regarding the previsions in the UK’s slowdown economy due 
to Brexit, the fiscal deficit will get worse in £12 billion per year, being superior to the net 
savings from Brussels payment. Finally, Brexit supporters claim for extreme EU regulation 
and, consequently, the costs that it involves on the economy. According to Crafts (2016), 
despite of having regulations that affect investment and innovation decisions, which can 
harm country’s performance, the UK has been able to maintain low levels of regulation, 
occupying the last positions on the OECD indicators.  
 To sum up, the costs reflected by the previous four arguments about membership-
fee represent no more than 1.4% of UK’s GDP. Comparing this value with the benefits from 
the free-trade and the high income levels, we find a positive annual effect on GDP of 8.6% 
to 10.6%, being clearly that the access to EU membership is extremely beneficial (Crafts, 
2016). Thus, regarding this analysis, Brexit could not seem to be a good decision from the 
UK side, and consequently, a recession on the UK’s economy would be reflected on the 
European trade partners as well, mainly on the ones that have high volumes of trade with 
the UK, as well as on the ones which integrate the same value chain as the United Kingdom. 
The international supply chains, which involves the path that the product follows through 
several intermediate production steps on different countries taking advantage of economies 
of scale and high levels of specialization, could no longer be viable after Brexit (Black, 2017). 
Moreover, as stated by Kierzenkowki et al. (2016), the uncertainty felt by the investors due 
to Brexit decision can be spillover to the European investments. The UK is stronger being 
an EU member, and at the same time the EU gains strength with the UK as member. With 
the UK’s withdrawal, some indicators suggest that EU share of world GDP and trade would 
be smaller than US and China, losing the world leadership (Kierzenkowski et al., 2016).  
 
2.3.  The options for the EU-UK relationship after Brexit  
As was referred previously, the Brexit negotiations assume a high complexity. An 
agreement between the UK and the other 27 EU members has to be reached, and the 
“Brexiters” requirements are not easy to be followed by the EU members, as they are on a 
“privileged” position comparing to the UK (Belke & Gros, 2017). The majority of the studies 
predict that no matter which option the negotiations reach, the UK’s welfare will be always 
negative, however the magnitude of this loss will be higher under a Hard Brexit (Dhringa et 
al., 2017a). Thus, depending on how negotiations will be developed, a range of possibilities 
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are open to the future of the UK, and the European Union, as despite of focusing on the 
UK’s economy, there will be direct and indirect consequences to the EU members. The 
European countries (mainly the ones with an intensive trade with the UK, such as Ireland) 
will be negatively affected, while the non-EU countries will gain from the trade 
diversification. However, in general the world economy will be harmfully affected (Dhringa 
et al., 2017a). Each possibility promotes a different impact on both parts, varying from 
remaining on the European Economic Area (EEA), the most optimistic scenario, named as 
“Soft Brexit”, to the total exit from the EU without a “friendly” agreement, where trade will 
follow the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, the most pessimistic scenario, called 
“Hard Brexit” (Kierzenkowski et al., 2016).  
Starting with the membership of the EEA, which includes the Norway, Iceland and 
Lieschtenstein, it was mentioned by several authors (e.g. Belke & Gros, 2017; Bergin et al., 
2016; Dhingra et al., 2017a; Kazzazi et al., 2017; Kierzenkowski et al., 2016; Sampson, 2017), 
as the most optimistic scenario. The EEA allows the UK to remain on the European Single 
Market, with the free movement of goods, services, capital and people. But, at the same time, 
the EEA members are outside the EU’s Customs Union, so the UK can trade with non-EU 
countries and conduct their own trade rules. This is a particular agreement since belonging 
to the Single Market implies belonging to the Customs Union, as the Single Market is a deeper 
integration level. So, following the integration concepts (in Section 2.1) the EEA members 
should belong to the Customs Union, but it not happens. Thus, goods continue to be traded 
freely, and there are no new barriers in services. So UK continues with the passporting rights, 
which “give financial firms based in one member state the right to provide services throughout the Single 
Market” (Sampson, 2017, pp. 165). However, the UK has to continue contributing to the EU 
budget, and has to follow the EU’s legislation, even with a very restricted position on the 
regulation design (Sampson, 2017). This scenario is advantageous for UK in terms of trade, 
as no trade barriers and non-tariff barriers are imposed, and the trade partnerships with the 
EU countries are not highly affected. Consequently, the impacts on the EU are equally 
minimized with this soft outcome, and the main concerns of managers about future of trade 
relationships are disregarded. However, with Brexit, the UK want to start controlling the 
immigration and with this solution it is not possible.  
Several authors (e.g. Dhingra et al., 2017b; Kazzazi et al., 2017; Kierzenkowski et al., 
2016; Lawless & Morgenroth, 2016; Sampson, 2017) mention that a second alternative is a 
bilateral agreement about trade and economic relationship. However, the Free Trade 
Agreements with the EU do not guarantee the free trade on services, and do not guarantee 
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the economic harmonization as the Single Market does (Kierzenkowski et al., 2016). 
Switzerland is an example of a Free Trade Agreement, being the most well integrated country 
outside the EEA (Sampson, 2017). The integration was accomplished gradually by reaching 
different bilateral treaties, which allow the Switzerland to participate partially on EU 
regulation. This partnership gives the flexibility to Switzerland participate on the programmes 
that it considers as most favourable for the country, but not allows it to be part of legislation 
design and it has to contribute to the EU budget (Sampson, 2017). At the same time, not 
being obligated to follow the EU legislations promotes a divergence in rules that increases 
the non-tariff barriers due to the introduction of border procedures (European Commission, 
2017d). Additionally, despite of not belonging to the Single Market, the Switzerland has free 
movement on goods and people as the other EEA members, but a deal about free trade in 
services was not finalized by the two parties, which not allows the Swiss banks to have 
passport rights. Thus, Switzerland case is an example of a Free Trade Area, excluding on the 
services. Switzerland also does not belong to the Customs Union. In general, the UK would 
continue trade with the EU freely, and would be able to trade with third countries, but the 
immigration control would be impossible.  
According to Dhringa et al. (2017b), Prins (2017), Sampson (2017), and Slater (2016), 
instead of a FTA, UK can also negotiate remaining on EU’s Customs Union with the EU, 
like Turkey, in order to guarantee free trade barriers on goods. This deal allows the UK to 
restrict immigration, as UK is outside the Single Market, and to not follow EU regulation, 
but the trade with non-EU countries is not possible and the non-tariff barriers increase due 
to regulatory divergence (Sampson, 2017). 
The last alternative mentioned on the literature (e.g. Black, 2017; Dhringa et al., 
2017b; Kierzenkowski et al., 2016; Lawless and Morgenroth, 2016; Sampson, 2017) is the 
hardest option, which creates the higher welfare loss to the UK and also to the EU members: 
trade with the EU under World Trade Organization (WTO). According to Dhringa et al. 
(2017b, pp.7), “each member must grant the same Most Favoured Nation (MFN) market access, including 
charge the same tariffs to all other WTO members”. Thus, bureaucracy and trade costs highly 
increase, since UK’s exports face importing MFN tariffs, as well as the non-tariffs barriers, 
as the UK has its own regulations. According to Lawless and Morgenroth (2016), outside the 
Single Market, the UK faces the WTO tariffs, which can vary from 0% until 80% depending 
on the type of product. Consequently, under this scenario, the Brexit impacts differ among 
EU members, the ones with a high intensive trade with the UK and which products traded 
face high WTO tariffs and high elasticity of price changes are the most affected. For the EU 
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countries, the trade in goods with the UK is expected to fall by 5% to 40% (Lawless and 
Morgenroth, 2016). Additionally, regarding the services, due to the loss of passporting rights, 
the exports of services from UK to the EU are expected to fall by half, and the trade costs 
are expected to increase around 20% (Kierzenkowski et al., 2016).  
Prins (2017) studied the Brexit impacts on Netherlands and highlighted four 
possibilities for the future trading relationship according to the negotiations position so far: 
EEA, Customs Union, Bilateral Agreement and WTO. However, on this research it is only 
mentioned three scenarios, because it is considered the Customs Union scenario as an 
example of a Bilateral Agreement, as well as the Switzerland case, which was considered by 
Prins (2017) as the “Bilateral Agreement”. So, in general, all the four possibilities are studied, 
the only difference is that Prins (2017) considered four different scenarios, not recognising 
the Customs Union as a particular case of a Bilateral Agreement. Table 2 summarizes the 
main features of each scenario.   
 
Table 2 – Summary of the different scenarios for Brexit  
Scenarios 
Tariffs on goods 
exported 
to/imported 
from UK 
Border & 
Customs 
Controls 
Free 
movement 
of service 
Free 
movement of 
EU citizens 
EU FTA´s 
with third 
countries 
 European Economic 
Area (EEA) 
No (except 
agricultural 
products) 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Bilateral 
Agreement 
Customs 
Union 
with the 
EU 
No (exceptions 
are possible) 
Yes No No Yes 
Switzerlan
d Case 
Probably on a 
selection of goods 
Yes 
Depend on 
the 
agreement 
Probably not No 
Hard Brexit 
Yes (probably 
WTO ) 
Yes No No No 
 
Besides referring the features of each scenario, Prins (2017) evaluates the likelihood 
of each. Thus, Prins (2017) believes that the EEA and Customs Union outcomes are not 
likely, as in these outcomes the British population’s requirements concerning the immigration 
control, free trade with third countries, and the reduction or non-contribution to the EU 
budget will not be totally followed. For him, the most likely scenario is the “Bilateral 
Agreement” as a Switzerland case, which content of negotiations is extremely uncertain, and 
the extent of the trade barriers will also vary according to the type of product and other 
Source:  Adapted from Prins (2017) 
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measures. The “Hard Brexit” scenario is also a very likely scenario, according to Prins (2017), 
where the trade regulations follow the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. This means 
the introduction of import tariffs, border controls and customs regulations, increasing the 
trade costs.  
To conclude, according to Sampson (2017) and Dhringa et al. (2017b), on January, 
2017, Theresa May announced that the UK intends to leave the Single Market (due to 
immigration control) as well as the Customs Union (due to new trade relationship with non-
EU countries), and aims to reach a new EFTA with EU members the most free possible in 
terms of goods and services. On the other side, the EU will not break the four pillars of 
Single Market, otherwise following the “Brexiters” wishes will stimulate other countries to 
have the same behaviour and leave the EU. These positions make the Hard Brexit seems 
more likely. According to Belke and Gros (2017), the losses for the EU members are 
expected to be 10 or 15 times lower than for the British economy: under an optimistic 
scenario, the losses for EU are predicted to be around 0.08% of GDP until 2030, while for 
the UK it is expected to have losses around 1.31%; under the Hard Brexit scenario, the losses 
get worst for both, the EU losses are approximately 0.44% of its GDP, while for the UK are 
estimated 4.21% of losses. Table 3 presents a summary of the expected losses on both parts 
for each scenario: 
Table 3 – Expected losses from the eptions for the EU-UK relationship after Brexit 
Source: Own elaboration  
  
Type of Relationship Expected Losses Author 
EEA 
UK losses: 1.31% of UK´s GDP. 
EU losses: 0.08% of EU´s GDP. 
Belke & Gros (2017) 
Bilateral 
Agreement 
Switzerland 
Case 
Fall in the EU exports to UK of 1.7%. 
While, a fall of 12.5% on the UK´s 
exports to the EU. 
 
Lawless & Morgenroth, 2016). 
Customs Union 
(Turkey Case) 
WTO 
Fall in the EU exports to UK of 3%. 
While, a fall of 22% on the UK´s 
exports to the EU. 
 
 
Kierzenkowski et al. (2016) 
 
 
UK losses: 4.21% of UK´s GDP. 
EU losses: 0.44% of EU´s GDP. 
Trade costs in services are expected to 
increase around 20%. 
 
Lawless and Morgenroth (2016) 
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2.4. Studies about the Brexit impacts on another European countries 
 Despite of being a recent topic, the impacts of Brexit on different members of the 
European Union had already been studied. Different researches were done in Germany and 
France (Bouoiyour & Selmi, 2016), Romania (Stanciu, 2017), Ireland ((Bergin et al., 2016) and 
(Vega, Espino & Valero (2018)), and Germany (Nothnagel and Heidenreich, 2017). The first 
authors, Bouoiyour and Selmi (2016), analyse the Internet search about Brexit as a 
quantitative measure to test if it influences the stock market of Germany, France and UK. 
The authors believe that this method is a potential tie helping to study the investors’ 
behaviour under periods of uncertainty, like Brexit. Stanciu (2017) did an analysis about the 
available information published by media and scientific papers to gauge the potential impacts 
of Brexit on Romania. On Ireland, Bergin et al. (2016) provide a macroeconomic analysis of 
the Brexit impacts on Ireland under the three different scenarios, mentioned on the previous 
section, creating a baseline in a scenario without Brexit and comparing it with the results 
obtained under the Brexit scenarios. Finally, Nothnagel and Heidenreich (2017) used an 
online survey to find the Germany companies’ perspective about the Brexit impacts. The 
studies presented were found on “Scopus” on December of 2017, by inserting as key-words: 
“Brexit”, “Impacts” and “Europe”. Studies about the impacts of Brexit on the European 
countries are not abundant, and some of them are not accessible. Thus, the selection of the 
described studies was based on these limitations, being analysed the few studies available on 
the platform.  
 The main features of each study are summarized on table 4, where the studies are 
organized by the chronologic order.   
           Table 4 - Similar studies 
 Country Methodology 
Findings Authors 
 
Germany
, France 
Quantitative: Analysis 
of the impact of 
Internet Search about 
“Brexit” on stock 
market returns, though 
the QR tool (set of 
regression curves) 
General result: uncertainty has a negative 
influence on EU stock markets. 
Germany: Equity return ranges between -
0.25 and -0.46. 
France:  Equity return ranges between    -
0.11 and -0.17. 
Bouoiyour & Selmi 
(2016) 
 Romania 
Qualitative: Study of 
the available 
information published 
by the media and 
scientific papers. 
Less funds from the EU and from the 
Romanian workers in the UK. 
Possibility of disaggregation of the EU. 
Romania become more strategic on the 
European context. 
Stanciu, 2017   
 
 
Ireland 
Quantitative: 
Macroeconomic 
Analysis of the Long-
EEA 
Trade between EU-UK would 
be reduced by 23%. 
Bergin et al. (2016) 
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Source: Own elaboration 
On the study done about Germany and France, Bouoiyour & Selmi (2016) used a 
quantile regression (QR tool), which consists on a set of regression curves that change across 
the different quantiles of the dependent variable, allowing the comparison between the 
“Brexit” attention and the UK and EU equities variation. Thus, this analysis will focus on 
the Internet search about Brexit in order to find its influence on the anxiety of market 
participants and how it might affect the investors’ decisions. The analysis driven by these 
authors can lead to subjective results and not reflect the full impacts in social, economic and 
political terms. However, the results seem very interesting. Although the general result is that 
uncertainty has a negative influence on the stock markets of the EU countries, the magnitude 
of the effect is not uniform across them. Hence, the attention to Brexit affects more the 
Germany stock market return than in France, and the UK is the less affected among the 
three countries. This is explained by the fact that the British market has a higher prominence 
to Germany, enjoying of a higher trade and investment relation than France. Besides the 
negative effect on EU market stock, the authors also believe that Brexit will create 
geopolitical impacts and will harm the prospects of European integration.  
  Contrarily to the previous study, Stanciu (2017) does an investigation of the online 
information published by media and scientific papers in order to measure which can be the 
potential effects of Brexit on Romania. This study reveals that Brexit had created uncertainty 
and can stimulate the disaggregation of the other members of the EU, as they can follow the 
same decision of the UK. Stanciu (2017) also found some authors arguing that the exit of 
Term effects, using the 
COSMO model to 
compare the three 
scenarios results with a 
baseline where no 
Brexit occur.  
Level of Irish output would be 
2.3% below than if Brexit not 
happen. 
EFTA 
Trade between EU-UK would 
be reduced by 31%. 
Level of Irish output would be 
2.7% below than if Brexit not 
happen. 
WTO 
Trade between EU-UK would 
be reduced by 50%. 
 Level of Irish output would be 
3.8% below than if Brexit not 
happen. 
 Germany 
Quantitative: Online 
Survey – Companies’ 
Perspective about the 
Impacts of Brexit 
Uncertainty: Companies are expecting 
that businesses get worst. 
On the companies’ perspective, the 
priority of negotiations is the free 
movement of goods (no barriers). 
1 in 10 companies are planning to shift its 
investment from the UK to other market. 
Nothnagel and 
Heidenreich (2017) 
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the UK from the EU can affect the labour market of Romania, mainly the Romanian workers 
that are working on the UK, as well as a decrease on the subsidies from the EU, as now the 
budget will be lower without UK contribution. The Romania Government also analysed the 
Brexit effects, accomplishing some negative and positive results. The negative points 
highlighted are related with the less funds received from the European Union as well as from 
the Romanian workers in the UK, and also the risk of dissociation of the European Union. 
The positive topics pointed out: Romania would be the sixth larger country in the EU, so 
there are more opportunities and the country becomes more strategic. Moreover, they found 
that the short-term impact on Romania will be narrow, suffering a short currency fluctuation. 
Bergin et al. (2016) analyses the Brexit impacts on Ireland, doing a macroeconomic 
analysis and quantifying the long-term effects on the Irish economy under the three different 
scenarios: EEA, EFTA and WTO by using the Core Structure Model (COSMO). This study 
seems very pertinent as Ireland is predicted to be the country most affected by the British 
decision due to its closest relationship and dependence of the UK. This study disregards the 
short-term impacts concerning the uncertainty and exchange rate fluctuation, because 
uncertainty is very complex to introduce on the models due to its high volatility. 
Furthermore, the authors focus on the long-term effects: reduction of trade volumes, FDI, 
productivity and migration, which are more readily measured on the models. These authors 
predict that the trade between the EU and UK would be reduced by 23% under EEA 
scenario, 31% under EFTA scenario, and 50% under WTO scenario. Concerning the 
estimation of the Brexit impacts on Ireland, firstly, with the COSMO, it is done a projection 
of the Irish economy until 2030 in a scenario that Brexit not occur, to serve as a baseline to 
compare the results obtained under the three alternative Brexit scenarios. The impact of 
Brexit on the Irish output under each scenario is presented on Figure 1.              
Fig. 1 Impact on the level of real output in Ireland across the three scenarios – Deviations from the baseline  
Source: Bergin et al., 2016, pp.9 
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On all scenarios the level of Irish output is consistently below comparing to the 
baseline, where the Brexit would not occur, being mostly affected under a WTO scenario 
comparing with the Soft scenario (EEA), as the other authors predicted (on the Section 2.2). 
This simulation suggests that the Irish economy will be strongly affected by the long-term 
impacts, being this shock initially promoted by the trade reduction, which will trigger 
consequences that affects other variables of Irish economy. Specifically, the first and big 
impact on the trade reductions will promote the decrease on Irish exports. Further, less 
exports leads to a decrease on labour demand, which affects the employment and increases 
the unemployment rate. By increasing the unemployment rate, the level of wages is reduced 
and the Irish population has lower personal income, which decreases the consumption, and, 
consequently, the domestic demand. With less domestic demand and national production, 
Government revenues decrease due to less taxes, and on the other hand, the Government 
expenditures increase due to higher unemployment. Thus, the British decision will create a 
“Domino Effect” on the Irish Economy, presented on the Figure 2, decreasing its level of 
output between 2.3% to 3.8%.  
  
  Vega, Espino and Valero (2018) also developed an analysis about the impacts of 
Brexit in Ireland, focusing on the impacts that it may have on the exports of Ireland to 
Europe, as a high percentage of exports is done through the maritime freight which passes 
from British territory. Thus, they reached the same conclusion of Bergin et al. (2016) 
foreseeing that Ireland will experience large losses with Brexit, mainly due to this geographic 
location. 
  Finally, the study carried out by Nothnagel and Heidenreich (2017) about Germany 
is based on an online survey. The survey was delivered to 2.200 Germany companies with 
Fig. 2 Domino effect – The Brexit impacts on the Irish output
 
BREXIT Trade 
Reduction
Decrease 
on Irish 
Exports
Decrease 
on 
Labour 
Demand
Increase 
Unemployment 
Rate
Reduction 
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level of 
wages
Lower 
Personal 
Income
Reduction of 
Consumption
Lower 
Domestic 
Demand
Gov. 
revenues 
decrease 
and 
expenses 
increase
Irish 
Output 
decreases 
on 2.3-
3.8%
Source: Own elaboration based on Bergin et al. (2016) 
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international operations. The study was based on 1.300 responses from companies that trade 
with the UK, representing 59% of the total companies surveyed. According to the results of 
the survey, the high uncertainty caused by Brexit have worsening the businesses, and the 
most pessimistic Germany companies, which are the ones that imports goods and services 
from UK, are expecting to get even worst on the near future, since changes on the supply 
chain may occur, as well as higher trade costs. In addition to find which is the companies’ 
perspective about the future, the survey also wants to gauge which are the priorities for the 
Brexit negotiations that companies consider to be the most important. The results show that 
the first priority is related with the free movement of goods (88% of the companies) 
concerning the uncertainty about the imposition of tariffs, and consequent higher trade costs. 
The following priority is the “minimal bureaucracy” as “after the UK withdraws from the EU, 
after all, companies would likely have to file formal customs declarations for imports and exports, as well as 
having to obtain export licenses for certain goods” (Nothnagel and Heidenreich, 2017, p.4). Figure 3 
summarizes the list of priorities according to companies’ perception. 
 
 
 Finally, the last topic that the survey done by Nothnagel and Heidenreich (2017) 
intends to measure is the probability of the German companies to shift its investment to 
other countries, concluding that almost one in ten companies with investments in the UK is 
planning to relocate to different markets. In the long-term, there is a high probability of a 
decrease in German investments in the United Kingdom. About one half of the German 
companies are planning to shift the investments to their own country, so Brexit can also 
bring some positive effects to Germany, and 39% of the companies intend to redirect their 
investment to outside the Europe.  
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Source: Own elaboration based on Nothnagel & Heidenreich (2017)   
Fig. 3 The classification of the aspects of Brexit negotiations 
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The studies mentioned so far highly differ from each other on the methodology as 
well as on the focus of the investigation, diverging from the companies’ perspective to the 
prediction of the impact on the country’s output. However, on all the studies the UK is a 
crucial trading partner, having a high weight on the volume of the exports and the imports 
of the countries. Moreover, the negative side of Brexit is highlighted on all, being presented 
the consequences of the uncertainty, as well as the trade costs that the UK decision could 
generate. 
  
18 
 
3. UK as Trading Partner of Portugal 
This chapter focuses on the analysis of the UK-Portugal trade partnership, being 
divided into two sections: the first section, which analyses the trade in goods and the second 
section, which studies the trade in services. Both sections analyses the evolution of trade 
volumes as well as the type of products most traded between the two countries.  
 
3.1. Trade in goods 
In terms of goods, the trade between Portugal and the United Kingdom has 
experienced an exponential growth until 2000, which had started when Portugal joined to 
the European Union, in 1986 (Figure 4). This growth was stable between 2000 and 2004, 
and starts to decrease until the crisis of 2009. In 2010, it is visible a great recover of the 
previous growth until 2016. In the last years, the amount of exports of goods substantially 
exceeds that of imports, so Portugal had experienced a positive commercial balance. This 
positive performance is reflected in almost all years, which means that Portugal exports more 
to the United Kingdom than it imports from the UK, and this difference has been more 
significant. 
 
 
Thus, according to Comtrade (2016c), the UK represents an important trading 
partner to Portugal, being the 4th largest market for Portuguese exports. In 2016, Portugal 
exported 3,531 million euros, representing 7% of total exports of goods, and imported 1,877 
million euros, representing 3% of total imports of goods.  
Source: Comtrade, 2016c 
Fig.4 Bilateral trade evolution with the UK (in terms of Goods) (Millions €) 
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Concerning the type of product, according to the OEC (2016a), in 2016, the principal 
sector of Portuguese exports to the UK is the machinery, representing 22% of Portuguese 
exports to the UK, followed by the automobile sector (almost 15% of total exports to the 
UK). In the third position is the textile sector, expressing almost 12% of Portuguese exports 
to the British market. In terms of Portuguese imports from the UK, according to the OEC 
(2016b) the most important sector is the automobile sector (almost 20% of Portuguese 
imports from the UK), followed by the chemical one (almost 18%), machinery (17%), metals  
(8%) and, finally, in the fifth position comes the textile sector, representing 4.5% of total 
Portuguese imports from the United Kingdom. The Figure 5 reflects these numbers for each 
sector.  
 
3.2. Trade in services 
In terms of services, the Comtrade database only provides information from 2000 
until 2014. On all these years, Portugal presents a surplus, exporting more services than 
importing (see Figure 6).  
 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Machinery
Vehicles
Textile
Chemicals
Metals
Imports PT-UK Exports PT-UK
     Source: Own elaboration based on OEC (2016a) and OEC(2016b) 
     Fig.5 % of Market Share of each sector on UK-Portugal trade 
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The evolution was not uniform, experiencing the highest value on 2007 on both 
imports and exports. The flows follow similar paths, which means that in almost all the years 
when the exports increase the imports also increase. The Figure 6 also shows that on the last 
years it is visible a recover of the growth in terms of services exports to the UK after a period 
of decline between 2008 and 2010. Thus, according to Comtrade (2014a), in 2014, Portugal 
exported to the UK 3,407 million euros, representing 14% of its total services exports, and 
imported from the UK 1,397 million euros, meaning 11% of its total services imports. These 
are important numbers, as UK presents a crucial weight on the Portuguese commercial 
balance, which might be affected by Brexit.  
Analysing some principal sectors, on Figure 7 we can see that Insurance and Travel 
are the services with the highest weight on both imports and exports, in 2014. In terms of 
Insurance service, Portugal exports to the UK 17.6%, while imports 16.3%. On the tourism 
sector, Portugal exports to the UK almost 17%, and imports almost 12%. The Transport 
service also assume an important amount in terms of exports, almost 12.5%, while in terms 
of imports is almost insignificant (0.066%). 
 
  Source: Comtrade, 2014 
Fig.6 Bilateral trade evolution with the UK (in terms of Services) (Million €) 
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                  Source: Own elaboration based on Comtrade (2014b) 
Although, globally, Portugal presents a negative commercial balance on merchandise 
trade, the Portuguese commercial balance with the UK is positive on both goods and 
services, and losing or decreasing the trade with the UK market would mean an even worst 
negative result. Moreover, the amount of exports to the UK has been increasing, and has 
experienced the highest values on the last years, this trend can be interrupted with the Brexit 
decision. 
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Fig.7 Market Share of each service sector on UK-Portugal trade (%) 
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4. Methodology 
 The present work aims at analysing the expected impacts of Brexit on the Textile and 
Apparel Sector. In this section, it will be presented the methodological aspects and the 
process that will be implemented in order to collect data. This chapter will be divided into 
three parts: firstly, it will be introduced the contextualization of the methodological process 
(Section 4.1), followed by the analysis of the two phases of the process:  the first phase is 
based on two interviews to Textile agents (Sections 4.2) and the second phase is a survey 
delivered to the Textile Portuguese managers in order to understand their perception about 
the potential impacts of Brexit on Portugal (Section 4.3).  
4.1. Description of the process 
  As Brexit is a very recent theme and the effective exit from the EU will happen only 
on 2019, at this moment becomes impossible to measure its impacts due to uncertainty 
enclosed on all the topics that Brexit involves. Further, the collection of data is very difficult 
to manage and the results obtained have a high probability of being unreliable or unstable, 
since the trade regulations, the UK financial obligations, among other topics are still being 
negotiated. Moreover, according to Black (2017) and Kierzenkowski et al. (2016), as Brexit is 
a very complex process, after the negotiations finish, the implementation and transactional 
period will be long, and the major impacts will only be felt after the actual UK’s withdrawal. 
Hence, this research will focus on the managers’ perceptions about the expected impacts that 
Brexit can cause on their companies, on the Portuguese Textile and Apparel Sector. Further, 
to achieve this goal, a combination of a qualitative and quantitative research will be followed 
based on primary data. 
 The methodological process will be divided into two parts. Firstly, this process will 
pass through the qualitative research with interviews to a Portuguese Textile agent and a 
British agent, who are intermediaries between Portugal and UK businesses and can better 
understand the impacts that Brexit may have on both parts, as well as the expectations that 
their clients and suppliers have about Brexit. Thus, the interview phase aims at analysing the 
perspective from both points of view, namely from a Portuguese agent and a British agent, 
about the expected impacts that Brexit may have on the commercial relationships between 
Portugal and the UK. On the second part, we will pass to the quantitative method, through 
a survey delivered to the Portuguese Textile companies. As mentioned previously, this survey 
procedure will be similar to the study done about Germany by Nothnagel and Heidenreich 
(2017), which analysed the Germany managers’ perception concerning different aspects that 
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Brexit involves. Hence, the survey starts by the characterization of the company analysing 
the commercial relationship between the company and the UK market, in order to 
understand the importance of this market to the company. Theoretically, according to 
Nothnagel and Heidenreich (2017), the companies for which UK market represents a high 
market-share may have a more pessimistic expectation about the impacts of Brexit on their 
business. The second part of the survey focuses on understanding the short-term impacts 
that some Portuguese companies may have already felt, their perspective about the most 
important aspects of negotiations between two parts, and, finally, their expectations about 
the future of commercial relationship between Portugal and the UK.   
 This methodological process is synthetized on the Figure 8. 
4.2. First phase: Interviews 
 The agents’ viewpoint, as was referred, assumes an extreme importance, as they are 
in the middle of the negotiation process, they have contact with the UK and Portuguese 
enterprises, and they see the different perceptions and impacts that Brexit have caused and 
may cause on both parts. Thus, with the interviews to the British Textile agent we can better 
understand the perspective of the UK’s companies, and extrapolate that information to get 
conclusions about the consequences on the Portugal side, which will be complemented with 
the perception of the Portuguese agent.  
 The interview is semi-structured following the questions of the survey, which 
involves different topics, some concerning the short-term impacts, which the agents 
considered to have effect on trade, and their expectations about the future impacts of Brexit 
on the trade relationship between Portugal and the UK. The interview will also approach 
some questions concerning the probability of the UK to shift the textile business to another 
Methodology
Interview to 
Textile Agents 
(Qualitative 
Research)
Survey to Textile 
Managers 
(Quantitative 
Research)
Data Collection Data Analysis Results
Fig. 8 - Methodology Process 
Source: Own elaboration 
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countries, in order to measure the likelihood of Portugal companies to lose UK clients, as 
well as if they think that a soft Brexit will be achievable, or in the hypothesis of the imposition 
of some trade barriers (Hard Brexit), will Portugal continue to be preferred as trade partner.   
 The interview to the Portuguese Textile agent took place on his office in Porto on 
19th of April 2018. This agent works with the bedding textile products, having contact with 
diverse British enterprises, mainly located in England, however the agent prefers the 
anonymity.  
 Regarding the interview to British Textile agent, it occurred through e-mail, on the 
24th to 26th of April 2018. This agent works with a multinational company in England, which 
imports from Portugal around 60% of its products. This company sells many different baby’s 
products, from bedding textiles to furniture. This agent also choose to maintain the 
anonymity.   
 
4.3. Second phase: Survey 
 The structure of the survey starts with the companies’ characterization, including the 
name of the company (Question 1), the type of relationship the company maintains with the 
UK (exporter, importer, both or none – Question 2), the weight of commercial transactions 
with the UK (Question 3), and, finally, the duration (number of years) of the commercial 
relationship with the British market (Question 4). Further, the survey will examine the Brexit 
impacts. In this way, Question 5 concerns about if the British decision about leaving the EU 
was a surprise. On the Question 6 we start the central part of the survey by measuring the 
short-term impacts already felt by the companies. Thus, the Question 6 inquires if the 
company have already felt the short-term impacts of Brexit, and the Question 7 is more 
particular, focusing on the already felt impacts of pound depreciation. The last part of the 
questionnaire is centred on a prospective view, related with the expectations about future 
and long-term impacts that managers may consider as more problematic and damaging. This 
part will comprise the priorities in terms of Brexit negotiations that managers perceive as the 
most important (e.g. Free Movement of Goods, Capital, People and Services, the Minimal 
Bureaucracy, among others – Questions 8 to 10). Finally, the last questions of the survey 
(Questions 11 to 13) cover the apprehensions about the future trade relation with the UK, 
determining the managers’ optimism or pessimism about the future. The questionnaire is in 
appendix A. 
25 
 
4.3.1. Characterization of the sample  
 The survey was sent to 2238 companies, on the 21th of May 2018, being resent three 
times: on the 4th and 18th of June, and on 9th of July 2018. The questionnaire was directed was 
to the manager/director of the company and was answered by 99 companies, corresponding 
to an answer rate of almost 4.5%. However, only 91 answers are valid to support the results, 
because there are companies who answered twice to the survey, and others whose answers 
are meaningless, reducing the answer rate to 4%. To find the information of each company, 
it was used the Sabi database (on the 10th of May 2018), where it is defined the industry that 
we want to study - Textile and Apparel - and then we define some variables considered 
relevant to characterize the firm, namely, the contacts of the company to send the survey, 
the description of the activity and the number of employers.  
Of the 91 companies that answered the questionnaire, 25 are exporters to the UK 
(27.5%), 3 are importers (3.3%), and there are 12 companies who are both importers and 
exporters (13.2%). The rest 51 companies (56%) have no commercial relationship with the 
British market. These numbers are summarized on the Figure 9.  
                       
            Source: Own elaboration based on survey’s responses to the Question 2 
 Of the 91 companies, 55 allowed to be identified, by answering to the first question 
of the survey (60%). Of these 55 companies, 30 are specialized on apparel (54.5%), while 12 
are producers of different types of textiles (bedding, towels, among others). The rest of 
companies, 6 are weavings and tissues manufactures, 5 are fabricators of apparel accessories 
(9%), and finally, 2 of companies are industrial dyeing and printing. 
 In terms of companies’ size, we will analyse the number of employees. According to 
the National Statistics Institute (NSI), a company is classified as “Micro-company” if it has 
a number of employees lower than 10, it is “Small” if it has between 11 and 49 employees, 
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Fig.9 Type of firms’ commercial relationship with the UK  
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“Medium” if it has between 50 and 249 employees, and “Large” if it has more than 250 
employees. Considering the 52 companies for which we have information concerning the 
number of employees,  19 have less than 10 employees (“Micro” - 36.5%), 27 are “Small 
companies”,  5  are “Medium” and only 1 company is “Large”. We can see through the 
Figure 10 that the majority of companies that answered to the survey are small enterprises 
with less than 50 employees (representing almost 90% of the sample).  
               Fig.10 Characterization of companies in terms of Number of Employees 
   
 We can also characterize our sample by the years of existence, in order to conclude 
if the companies are recent or with an old history. For this, we use a scale of 4 degrees: the 
recent companies with less than 5 years, between 5 and 10 years, between 11 and 20 years, 
and more than 20 years. We conclude that the majority of the companies (58.2%) of our 
sample is characterized by experienced companies with more than 20 years of existence, 
followed by 11 companies who are in the market for more than 11 years and less than 20 
years. The more recent companies are in the same number, with 6 companies existing for 
less than 5 years and other 6 with an existence of between 6 and 10 years (Figure 11). 
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 Another remarkable aspect of our sample is that almost 82% of the companies are 
located on the North of Portugal, with only 8 companies on the Centre of the country 
(14.5%), and 1 company in the South (1.8%) and 1 in Azores (1.8%). These numbers are a 
reflection of the “Vale do Ave” Region, in which the Sector in analysis is recognized as 
forming a cluster in this region.  
  Focusing now on the weight of the commercial transaction with the UK (Question 
3) we compare two groups of companies: exporters (E) vs. importers plus importers and 
exporters (IIE) (the number of importers is small – only 3 companies - we decided to join 
this group to the companies who export and import, reaching a total of 15 companies - 
16.5% of the sample). For the majority of companies in both groups the weight of 
commercial transactions with the UK is less than 5%. From the exporters view, 13 companies 
have less than 5% (56.5%), 6 have between 5 and 20% (26%), 1 company has between 20 
and 50%, and, finally, 3 companies sell more than 50% of its total sales to the United 
Kingdom (13%) (this question has a total of 23 answers, as the question is optional and 2 
companies preferred not to answer). Regarding the IIE perspective, 86.7% imports less than 
5% from the UK (13 companies), remaining 6.7% for the weight of 5% to 20% and 6.7% 
for between 20% and 50%. These percentages are presented on the Figure 12, in which we 
can find very similar characterization between the two groups.  
            Fig.11 Characterization of companies in terms of Years of Existence 
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 Concerning the Question 4 about the duration of the trade relationship with UK, the 
majority of both groups have a long commercial relationship with the UK (more than 5 years 
– more than 70%). From the exporters side, of the 22 companies that answered, 16 maintains 
a trade relationship for more than 5 years (72.7%), while 4 companies trade with UK for 
more than 3 years and less than 5, 1 company for more than 2 years and one company less 
than 1 year. On the IIE group, 80% of the companies trade for more than 5 years with the 
UK (12 companies), while only 1 and 2 companies trade for between 3 and 5 years, and more 
than 2 years, respectively (Figure 13). Once again it is visible a relatively similar pattern of 
both groups.  
           Fig.12 Weight of commercial transactions with the UK 
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         Source: Own elaboration based on survey’s responses to the Question 4 
 Regarding the last question of the sample’s report about if British decision was a 
surprise for the Portuguese managers, it is notable an unexpected reaction, with almost 80% 
of the companies with commercial relationship with the UK answering “Yes”, affirming that 
Brexit was a surprise for them. Thus, the British decision were already predictable by the 
majority of Portuguese Textile managers, who keeps the same opinion no matter the type of 
relationship maintains with the UK.  
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5. Results  
 In this chapter we will approach the results from the two sources of data collection: 
the interviews to the agents (Section 5.1) and the survey to the managers (Section 5.2).  
 While the interviews will focus on the prospective opinion of managers about the 
potential impacts of Brexit, the survey results will make a comparison between the perception 
of importers (IIE) vs. exporters, and on the question with relevance we will introduce a third 
group, the companies with no trade relationship with the UK.  
5.1. Interviews 
 From the Portuguese Textile agent perspective, who was surprised with British 
decision, in terms of short-term impacts, he have already felt a fall on the sales due to a 
decrease on the demand for the Portuguese products from the British companies, since 
August 2017, mainly due to the pound depreciation. This effect was already also felt by 
Germany business, since the exports of goods to the UK decrease 3.5% during the last year 
(Nothnagel and Heidenreich, 2017). Concerning the expectations about the type of the future 
commercial relationship, he believes in a Soft Brexit, as he states “if a Hard Brexit happens, 
it is predicted to an increase of 10-15% on the custom duties, and consequently, an increase 
of prices of around 25-30%, which unavoidably leads to a higher demand for the Asian 
market”. Thus, the agent considers that in the case of Hard Brexit, his British clients will 
change the Portuguese suppliers. In sum, even believing in a Soft Brexit, he trusts that the 
possibility of positive impacts for Portugal is highly unlikely.  
 From the British agent perspective, he disregards the Brexit impacts on Portugal as 
it is a very small country comparing to other European countries. He considers that Europe 
needs UK, and, consequently, there is a pressure to avoid changes in commercial relation, in 
order to not affect the Europe exportations to British market and vice-versa. Hence, from 
the scenarios available the British agent believes in the bilateral agreement – “Customs’ 
Union” condition: it will be obtained an agreement with free movement of goods (without 
taxes), but with customs control, as with the withdrawal from Europe, the England will have 
different regulation from the EU members. As he states: “Europe exports more to U.K. then 
U.K. exports to Europe so it is in Europe’s interest and advantage to make sure commercial 
relationship are maintained same as now. Free movement of goods without any tariffs. There 
will be customs control but no duty or any taxes.”  
 To conclude, although it is predictable by the authors more damaging consequences 
to the UK than to the EU members, it is visible a pessimistic vision from the Portuguese 
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agent, who trust in negative consequences for Portugal, even if soft, contrasting with the 
British agent, who has an optimistic opinion, disregarding completely the Hard Brexit 
possibility.  
5.2. Survey  
 The main objective of the present work is to analyse the managers’ perceptions 
regarding the impact of Brexit. Thus, on this section we will pass to the central part of the 
analysis, regarding the measurement of the short-term impacts already felt by the companies 
(Section 5.2.1), the managers’ perception about the priorities of the negotiations (Section 
5.2.2) and the prospective opinion about the impact of Brexit on the trade relationship 
between Portugal and the UK (Section 5.2.3). In this way, the analysis of the results will 
follow a comparison between the type of companies. It will focus on the answers of 
companies which maintains trade with the UK, comparing the exporters and importers’ 
perspective. However, there are questions on the survey that we can also consider the 
answers of the companies with no trade with the UK, namely the ones regarding the priorities 
of the negotiations as well as their expectations about the future of the commercial 
relationship between Portugal and the UK. Thus, on these two topics the analysis will be 
between the three groups of enterprises. As was referred, as the sample of companies which 
are only importers is really small, with only three companies available, I decided to aggregate 
this group to the companies who export and import, reaching a total of 15 companies (16.5% 
of the sample). This way, we can achieve more reliable results from the importers’ analysis.  
 
5.2.1.  Short-term impacts of Brexit 
 Starting now the measurement of the impacts already felt by the companies, in terms 
of short-term impacts (Question 6), in a general way, the companies have not felt significant 
impacts yet. Concerning the 24 of the exporters who answered to this question, 15 felt no 
impact (62.5%), against 8 who felt moderated negative impacts (33.33%) and one who felt 
very negative impacts (4.1%). Of the IIE group, as it includes exporters and importers, we 
have to distinguish the impacts felt on the exports and imports. There was an unanimity 
concerning the importers (Purchase part), with the 15 companies answering “None” impact 
felt. The impacts on the Sales part (exporters) is reported by 10 of the group as “None” 
(83.3%), one as “Moderately Negative” (8.3%) and one as “Very Negative” (8.3%). 
Comparing this result with the previous exporters group’ result there is a similarity as the 
large majority felt no short-term impacts (Figure 14). 
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                   Fig.14 Short-term impacts of Brexit announcement 
 
Focusing particularly on the pound depreciation effects (Question 7), the majority of the 
exporters felt no impact (13 companies – 54.2%), while 8 felt “Moderated Negative impacts” 
(33.3%), 2 felt “Very Negative impacts” (8.3%) and one “Very Positive impacts” (4.1%). 
Concerning the IIE group, happens again a division between the import side, and export 
side. Concerning only the Purchase side, it is visible a high density on the “None” option by 
10 of the companies (66.7%), and the other 5 companies are dispersed by the “Moderately 
Negative” (1 company), the “Moderated Positive” (3 companies) and “Very Positive” (1 
company). Regarding the Sales part, 50% of the sample (6 companies) felt no impact, while 
the other 50% is equally divided between the Moderated measures. So, in general, even if the 
majority have felt no short-term impacts, there is a “relevant” percentage of the companies 
who felt negative impacts, mainly the exporters, even if in number represent few companies 
as the sample size is small. These results are summarized on the Figure 15.  
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                       Fig.15 Pound depreciation impacts 
 
 Comparing these results with the ones reached by Nothnagel and Heidenreich (2017), 
in terms of short-term impacts, the Germany managers felt that the uncertainty surround 
Brexit had worsening significantly the businesses, with a fall on the exports to the UK of 
around 3.5%. This conclusion contrast with Portugal results as for the majority of Portuguese 
companies have felt no short-term impacts.  
 
5.2.2. Priorities on the Brexit negotiations 
 Regarding now the analysis of the aspects of negotiations, on the Question 8 it is 
asked to the manager to rate the different priorities in a Likert scale, from 1 (no importance) 
to 5 (very important), obtaining the Table A of the Appendix B and the Figure 16. At this 
question the companies with no trade with the UK are able to answer. Although the result 
of the answer may depends on the type of relation that the company maintains with the UK, 
for instance companies who trade with the UK may have a higher preference for the Free 
Movement of Goods comparing with the group without trade, this question represents a 
general perception of a manager with a social opinion no matter the type of relation that the 
company keeps with the British market. Thus, at this point, raise a comparison between 
companies with trade (Exporters and IIE – TRADE Group) vs. companies with no trade 
with the UK (NO TRADE). 
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               Figure 16 Average of classification of the aspects on negotiations in a scale from 1 to 5  
 
                Source: Own elaboration based on survey’s responses to the Question 8 
 Through the Figure 16, we see that “NO TRADE” group give a higher importance 
to the social aspect of Free Movement of People than to the Free Movement of Goods. This 
group with no commercial relationship, in average, only rates three of the aspects with more 
than 4: Free Movement of People, Free Movement of Goods, and Free Movement of 
Services, which are the most important pillars of the Single Market. Moreover, all the aspects 
have lower importance for them than for companies with trade. Thus, stays clear that this 
group is much lower concerned about the Brexit topics than the companies that maintains a 
trade partnership with the UK. In order to conclude if effectively the importance attributed 
to the negotiations depends on the fact that company maintains or not a trade relationship 
with the UK we compare the average of two groups through a T-Test, testing the following 
hypothesis: 
Ho: the average of two groups is not significantly different. 
H1: the average of two groups is significantly different. 
We obtain a t=5.1 and a p-value=0 (the SPSS results are on Appendix C). The p-value=0 is 
always lower to any level of significance (α). For instance, for a level of 5%, p.-value=0<α. 
So, we reject HO, and conclude H1, i.e, the average of the classification of companies with 
trade with the UK is significantly different from the average of the companies with no 
commercial relationship with the UK. So, we can conclude that the importance attributed to 
the aspects of Brexit’ negotiations depends on the type of relationship that the company 
keeps with the UK. 
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 Doing now a more precise analysis by disaggregating the TRADE group, in order to 
compare the exporters and IIE perception about his topic, we obtain the following Figure 
17: 
                      Fig.17 Average of classification of the aspects on negotiations in a scale from 1 to 5  
  
 It is consensual that exporters and importers are on the same side at this question. 
They give an extreme importance to all the aspects of negotiations being all scored in average 
with a scale higher than 4, both considering the aspect with higher importance the “Free 
Movement of Goods” and with the lower importance the “Free Movement of Capital”. 
Doing a t-test to test if the means between the two groups (Exporters vs. IIE) are 
significantly different, we obtain a t=-1.649 and a p-value=0.125, so we can conclude that 
the means between the companies with trade are not significantly different. Thus, the rates 
of both are very similar in all the aspects.  This result also reflects the conscious that managers 
attribute to this topic, as the final agreement that result from these negotiations will influence 
all the consequently impacts felt in Europe. For instance, to achieve the Free Movement of 
Goods (recorded as 4.67 by both) will be crucial to minimize the impacts on economies felt 
by both parts, since reaching the most closed agreement to the Single Market conditions 
would be the “ideal” situation in terms of minimization of the impacts for both parts, 
preventing the imposition of tariffs and trade barriers, as we referred before. The Free 
Movement of People (also included on the Single Market) is also a subject that worries the 
managers not only concerning the impacts on their company, but mainly, due to the impacts 
that it would have on society. And, finally the Minimal Bureaucracy, scored by the importers 
with 4.6, the second aspect more important, worries the managers in terms of fill formal 
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customs declaration, export licenses, among others. For the companies with no trade with 
the UK, we can see that, although the averages are all higher than 3.7, the importance 
attributed to the aspects of negotiations is lower when comparing with the exporters and IIE 
groups.  
 The Question 9 gives the option to the manager insert other aspect of negotiations 
that may consider important, and only one company has answered: “Exchange Rate Policy”. 
 Studying now the order attributed to the most tree important aspects of the 
negotiations by the managers, on the Question 10, we achieve the following Table 5: 
Table 5 – Classification of top 3 of the aspects of the negotiations 
 1º 2º 3º  
 EXPORTERS (19 COMPANIES) TOTAL 
FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS 18 1   19 
MIN. BUREAUCRACY   3 6 9 
FREE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL   7 2 9 
RAPID IMPLEMENTATION   2 1 3 
FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE 1 4 7 12 
CONSISTENT LEGISLATION   1 2 3 
FREE MOVEMENT OF SERVICES   1 1 2 
  IMPORTERS/IMPORTERS+EXPORTERS (8 COMP.)  
FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS   3 5 8 
MIN. BUREAUCRACY 1 3 3 7 
FREE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL     1 1 
RAPID IMPLEMENTATION   1 2 3 
FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE 3     3 
CONSISTENT LEGISLATION   1 2 3 
FREE MOVEMENT OF SERVICES   1 1 2 
  GLOBAL –TRADE (27 COMPANIES)  
FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS 18 4 5 27 
MIN. BUREAUCRACY 1 6 9 16 
FREE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL 0 7 3 10 
RAPID IMPLEMENTATION 0 3 3 6 
FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE 4 4 7 15 
CONSISTENT LEGISLATION 0 2 4 6 
FREE MOVEMENT OF SERVICES 0 2 2 4 
  NO TRADE (38 COMP.)  
FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS 20 5 13 38 
MIN. BUREAUCRACY 1 4 5 10 
FREE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL 2 6 3 11 
RAPID IMPLEMENTATION 1 4 2 7 
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FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE 8 8 6 22 
CONSISTENT LEGISLATION 2 1 4 7 
FREE MOVEMENT OF SERVICES   4 10 14 
     
Source: Own elaboration based on survey’s responses to the Question 10 
On table 5, we can see that the Free Movement of Goods is clearly the main priority aspect 
of negotiation for all the groups. On this Question we see a more different opinions between 
the Exporters and the IIE group:  the exporters are more centred on 4 aspects, which they 
considered as more priority – Free Movement of Goods, People, Capital and Minimal 
Bureaucracy, while the IIE group are more dispersed, with 8 managers including the Free 
Movement of Goods, and 7 the Minimal Bureaucracy in the top 3 of negotiation’s 
importance. The other aspects have a high dispersion of opinion. A very interesting curiosity 
between all the groups is that all the companies that answered the question attributed 1º, 2º 
or 3º rate to the “Free Movement of Goods”. Comparing the companies with trade with 
companies without trade, we see more similarities than the previous question, as the only big 
difference found is the “Free Movement of Services”, which is the third most important 
priority for the NO TRADE group, while is the last priority for the companies who trade 
with the UK.  
 Hence, this analysis of the aspects of negotiations allows us to conclude that the 
“Free Movement of Goods” assumes clearly the highest importance by the managers, which 
is understandable due to the high probability of Brexit cause harmful consequences on the 
trade between Portugal and the UK, affecting the stability of the companies. Avoid the 
imposition of trade barriers, customs legislations and bureaucracies and, consequently, higher 
trade costs is the priority at this moment to the companies.  
 Making the comparison with Germany preferences concerning the priorities on 
negotiations, the results are not unanimous between the two countries. 
Table 6 – Comparison between Portugal and Germany perception in terms of priorities on the 
negotiations 
 Source: Own elaboration based on the studies done in Portugal vs. Germany  
 Free 
Mov.Goods 
Free 
Mov. 
Persons 
Free 
Mov. 
Services 
Min. 
Bureaucracy 
Rapid 
Implem. 
Free 
Mov. 
Capital 
Consis. 
Legisl. 
Portugal 1ª 2ª 3ª 4º 5º 6º 7º 
Germany 1º 7º 5º 2º 4º 3º 6º 
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Through the Table 6, stays clear that the Free Movement of Goods assumes the principal 
priority on negotiations as the prevention of imposition of trade barriers becomes crucial 
concerning the minimization of trade costs, as we concluded on the literature. The other 
cells highlighted focus on the other priorities that assumes similar importance to both 
countries, as “Consistent Legislation” seems not so important, and the “Rapid 
Implementation” has a medium significance to the managers. The discrepancy on the 
opinion of the managers focus on the “Free Movement of Persons” which to Portugal 
assumes a high importance, contrarily to Germany, being on the last position. This 
demonstrates a less importance attributed by the German managers to the social problems 
that Brexit will also cause, because, according to the Pordata (2016d), the emigration tax of 
German is higher (even if not significantly) comparing with the Portuguese tax, so the 
Germany managers should be more conscious about the problems that Germany’ 
emigrants on the UK may face with Brexit.   
 
5.2.3. Expectations about the future trade relationship 
 Passing now to Question 11 analysis, which is only directed to the IIE group 
concerning the possibility of the Portuguese company change UK as supplier in the case of 
Hard Brexit, where trade barriers are imposed.  
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: Own elaboration based on survey’s responses to the Question 11 
 Through the Figure 18, it is clear a certainty from the IIE group to this question. 
From the 15 companies, 13 answered “Yes” (86.7%) when facing the hypothesis a Hard 
Brexit with an introduction of trade barriers, and consequently, higher cost associated to 
the importations of raw-materials from the UK. The rest 13.3% of the companies (2 
companies) are divided between the “No” and “Do Not Know”.  
13
1 1
YES NO DO NOT KNOW
Fig.18 Possibility of the Portugal to change the UK as its supplier 
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 The Question 12 follows the same logic but for the Exporters group, if in case of 
Hard Brexit they think that the UK will change their Portuguese suppliers, measuring the 
likelihood of Portuguese companies lose their British market. The managers have available 
to this question a Likert-Scale from 1 to 5, where “1” means a “Very Low Probability” of 
the UK change Portugal as its supplier, and “5” means a “Very High Probability”. Results 
are synthetized on Figure 19.  
               Fig.19 Likelihood of Portugal lose UK market  
 
                Source: Own elaboration based on survey’s responses to the Question 12 
On this question the unanimity is not so evident and it is visible “less negative” perception 
from the exporters when comparing to the IIE group. From the 24 companies who 
answered to this question, 7 consider a very high possibility of UK change Portugal as its 
supplier, and 8 a high probability, which completes a 62.5% of the exporters who presents 
a negative expectation towards the hypothetical consequences of a Hard Brexit. On the 
other side, we have 6 companies who consider that have no certainty on this question, so 
rate the question with “3”. And, finally, we have 7 companies who have a more positive 
perception and believe in a low possibility of Portugal companies lose the UK market with 
a Hard Brexit. 
 Concluding this analysis, the final question of the survey concerns the managers’ 
expectations about the potential impacts that Brexit may cause on the future trade 
relationship between Portugal and the UK. Answers are synthetized on Figure 20. 
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               Fig.20 Potential impact that Brexit may have on the future commercial relationship between              
Portugal and UK 
 
                 Source: Own elaboration based on survey’s responses to the Question 13 
Given the huge uncertainty around Brexit, this last question becomes crucial to understand 
the personal expectation of each manager about the potential impact that Brexit may cause 
on Portuguese economy. In a general mode, on the Figure 20, we can conclude that no 
matter the type of relationship that the company maintains with the UK, the majority of 
the managers presents a negative vision about the future of relationship between the two 
countries: of the total of 84 companies that answered to this question (75% of the sample) 
63 presents a pessimism relatively to this topic, against 10 who presents a positive 
impression about the future (almost 12%). When considering the type of relation that 
company keeps with the UK, we see that in the NO TRADE group, 6 companies 
considering moderately positive effects and 8 “No Effects”. Only one IIE and 3 exporters 
consider the “Moderated Positive” option. The “Moderated Negative” option is the one 
with more centred opinions, with 16 of the exporters (66.7%), 12 of the IIE (80%) and 27 
of the NO TRADE (60%). Although these numbers reflect the negativism associated with 
this topic, these managers expect a Soft Brexit result, which will create “soft/moderated” 
damaging consequences to Portugal. The “Very Negative” category, which is perceived as a 
high possibility of a Hard Brexit happens, is only predicted by two exporters (8.3%), two 
IIE (13.3%) and 4 NO TRADE (8.9%).  
 Through this overall analysis, we can conclude that even if the British market is not 
very relevant to these companies, as it represents less than 5% of its market share to the 
majority of them, and the already impacts that they have felt were not very significant, the 
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managers assume a negative position towards the potential impacts that Brexit may cause 
on the trade relationship between Portugal and the UK, no matter the type of relationship 
that the company maintains with the UK, as we saw on the results of Question 11, 12 and 
13. 
 Making the parallel analysis with the Germany study, which have concluded that 
importers and the companies with a high percentage of weight of trade with the UK are the 
most pessimistic. We can confirm on the Figure 18 and 20 the pessimism reflected by the 
importers, as only one company of the IIE group believe in positive impacts of Brexit on 
future. So although the worst short-term impacts were felt by the exporters, the importers 
are more pessimistic about the future. Regarding the second part of conclusion, it is also 
verified by the singular analysis, as of the four Portuguese companies with more than 50% 
of trade with the UK, three expect moderated negative impacts and one very negative 
impacts on the businesses with the UK. Moreover, by identifying the four companies from 
the TRADE group that expect “Very Negative Impacts” on the Question 13 on the Sabi 
database, we find that three exports to the UK between 5% and 20% of its sales and one 
more than 50%, which means that are companies to which the UK have a significantly 
weight. In general, both Portuguese and Germany’s managers are expecting to their 
business with the UK get worst in the upcoming months, showing a negative perspective 
towards Brexit.  
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6. Conclusion, limitations & further implications  
The main objective of this research is to explore the potential Brexit impacts on 
Portugal, particularly on the Textile and Apparel sectors, through the managers and agents’ 
perspective. Thus, based on a survey, the results indicate that in the evaluation of a restricted 
sample (91 companies), the exit of the UK from the European Union will affect negatively 
(in a moderated way) the trade partnership between the UK and Portugal. Although the 
magnitude of this effect is unknown since the negotiation are not finished yet, the managers 
trust in a soft result, as the short-term impacts felt by them did not have a huge significance.  
Even if the short-terms were not significant to the Portuguese companies, it is visible that 
Portuguese Textile companies are expecting that Brexit will generate negative impacts on 
their businesses with the UK. It seems that companies believe in a Soft scenario, as they are 
not trusting in very negative consequences, however they predict that their trade with the 
UK may will have limitations in terms of trade barriers and bureaucracy implications.  
However, if a Hard Brexit happens both Portuguese importers and exporters predict 
a change of UK and Portugal as supplier, respectively. The main conclusion of a negative 
expectation of the impacts in Portuguese economy due to Brexit is similar to the ones 
reached by Vega et al. (2018) and Bergin et al. (2016) in Ireland, who for all type of scenarios 
predict negative impacts on Irish output. On Romania, equally to Portugal, Stanciu (2017) 
also predict negative impacts on Romania’s economy. Besides these studies, we have the 
principal study done about Germany by Nothnagel and Heidenreich (2017), as was referred 
previously, which was the based to construct the survey to Portuguese managers. In a general 
view, there was some similarities between the two countries concerning the type of 
companies which present a more pessimistic opinion about the potential impacts that Brexit 
may cause in their own country (the companies with the highest percentage of trade with the 
UK and importers are more pessimistic than exporters), as well as the first priority in 
negotiation for the companies, which is the “Free Movement of Goods”. The main 
differences are centred on the short-term impacts felt by the companies and the ranking of 
priorities. Thus, we can conclude that the main result of this research is in line with the other 
authors that studied other European countries, even if using or not different methodologies.  
In addition to this, we found another important conclusion when comparing the two 
main groups of companies: TRADE vs. NO TRADE. The importance attributed to each 
aspect of negotiation depends on if the company maintains or not a trade partnership with 
the UK. It is visible a lower importance attributed to this topic by companies that have no 
commercial relation with the UK.  
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However, this research presents some limitations. Firstly, as the Brexit happens very 
recently, the number of studies about its impacts is very limited and the ones that exist only 
focus on the UK side. Moreover, these available researches focus on the same points and are 
developed under a huge uncertainty, centring on the short-term impacts, as the long-term 
impacts are unmeasurable at this point. Due to this last limitation, the results of this study is 
based on Portuguese managers’ perception about different topics around Brexit, however 
the answer rate is very low and the majority of the firms who answered the questionnaire has 
a low weight of UK market share, which do not allow to obtain sustained or high reliable 
results. As we see from our sample the companies with higher percentage of trade with the 
UK are the most pessimistic ones, but our general conclusion is that Brexit will create 
moderated negative. This can happen due to the fact that our sample is characterized by a 
low percentage of trade with the UK. Moreover, although the interviews to the agents analyse 
two different perspectives, these interviews only focus on one-way relationship: Portugal as 
supplier and the UK as client. So the inverse way (Portugal as client and UK as supplier) is 
disregarded in this analysis.  
Therefore, this research can create impacts in terms of companies’ management. 
Firstly, this study aims to warn managers for the high probability of damaging consequences 
of Brexit on their companies. If the free movement of goods is not achieved, implying the 
imposition of trade barriers and trade bureaucracies, and, consequently, higher transaction 
costs, the exporters will be forced to increase their prices, and the possibility of UK change 
to other markets, mainly China and U.S is very likely. Moreover, for companies with a high 
percentage of trade with the UK (the most pessimistic ones), who is not a majority on our 
sample, it is advisable to fix the exchange rate of their sales, in order to avoid the cambial 
risk, and, most important, to diversify the risk by searching for another markets, otherwise 
losing the UK clients may lead to the bankrupt of these companies.  
To conclude, following the recent news of Euronews (2018), until June of 2018 the 
negotiations were delayed causing doubts if the March of 2019 will be a possible date of exit. 
Actually, at August of 2018 the ministers have compromised to do the negotiations in a 
continuous way in order to avoid an exit without a defined and complete agreement. They 
affirm that points as the value that UK must pay to leave and the immigrants’ rights are 
almost finalized. According to Euronews, a study made by the Sky Data find that 65% of 
British population predict a Hard Brexit scenario, and 50% of population want a new 
referendum, while 40% do not accept and 10% do not know which side may opt. 
International Monetary Fund argues that Brexit impacts won´t be equally to all European 
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countries, being the most negatively affected ones: Irland, Netherlands and Belgium. 
Although the possibility of an exit without an agreement be a much cited option by the 
ministers, at this moment, the uncertainty around Brexit remains very high, being impossible 
to make a reliable conclusion about the real impacts that Brexit will cause.  
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Appendix 
A. Survey about "The Expected Impacts of Brexit on the Portuguese Textile 
companies"  
 
After the referendum, where the UK population said "YES" to Brexit, on March 
2017 the UK announced officially the withdrawal from the European Union. This 
survey aims to evaluate the managers’ perception about the expected impacts of 
Brexit on their companies. All the information is confidential, and it will be treated 
in aggregated terms and used exclusively to academic objectives.  
Please try to answer to all questions, and they should be answered by a member of 
the administration.  
 
A. Company Profile 
1. Company’s Name: ____________________ 
 
2. Indicate if your company keeps a commercial relationship (in terms of 
exports/imports) with the UK. In case of a negative answer please answer 
only to the questions 8, 9, 10 e 13. In case of a positive answer, please 
answer to all questions. 
 Yes No 
Exporter 
  
Importer 
  
 
3. Indicate the weight of the commercial transactions with the UK. 
 >5% 5%-20% 20%-50% >50% 
Exporter (in terms of 
%Sales) 
    
Importer (in terms of 
%Purchases) 
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4. Indicate how many time ago the UK is a commercial partner of the company. 
 < 1 year > 2 years 3 years – 5 years > 5 years 
As Exporter 
    
As Importer 
    
 
B. The Brexit’s Impacts  
5. Indicate if the referendum result was a surprise for you. 
 Yes 
 No 
 Do not know / Do not answer  
 
6. Indicate if Brexit has caused any impact on your company. 
 Very 
Negative 
Moderately 
Negative 
None Moderately 
Positive 
Very Positive 
Exporter (in terms of 
%Sales) 
     
Importer (in terms of 
%Purchases) 
     
 
7. On the three months after the referendum, the pound suffered a strong 
depreciation. Indicate if this happening had any financial and/or managerial 
impact. 
 Very 
Negative 
Moderately 
Negative 
None Moderately 
Positive 
Very Positive 
As Exporter 
     
As Importer 
     
 
  
v 
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8. Indicate the degree of importance of the following topics on the negotiations 
between the UK and the European Union. (1 - No Importance / 5 - Very 
Important) 
    1     2   3     4   5 
Free Movement of Goods 
     
Minimal Bureaucracy 
     
Free Movement of Capital 
     
Rapid Implementation 
     
Free Movement of People 
     
Consistent Legislation 
     
Free Movement of Services 
     
 
9.  If you consider that there is another aspect more relevant than the ones 
mentioned, please indicate it. 
________________________________ 
10. Order the (only) three topics that you consider as most important. 
    1º     2º   3º 
Free Movement of Goods 
   
Minimal Bureaucracy 
   
Free Movement of Capital 
   
Rapid Implementation 
   
Free Movement of People 
   
Consistent Legislation 
   
Free Movement of Services 
   
Other 
   
 
11. In case of having UK’s suppliers, if Brexit leads to the imposition of trade 
barriers, indicate if you plan to look for new suppliers. 
 Yes 
 No  
 Do not know / Do not answer  
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12. In case of being an exporter to the UK, if Brexit leads to the imposition of 
trade barriers, indicate the degree of probability of your clients look for new 
countries to buy. 
    1     2   3     4    5  
Low Probability  
    High Probability 
 
13. Indicate your expectations about the impact of Brexit on the future of the 
commercial relationship between Portugal and the UK. 
 
 Very Negative Moderately 
Negative 
None Moderately 
Positive 
Very Positive 
Impact 
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B. Results of Question 8: Classification of Aspects of Brexit’ s Negotiations  
Table A – Synthetization of managers’ classification of the aspects of negotiations 
 1 2 3 4 5  
 
EXPORTERS 
 (24 COMPANIES) AVERAGE 
FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS     2 4 18 4,67 
MIN. BUREAUCRACY     3 11 10 4,29 
FREE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL   1 7 7 9 4,00 
RAPID IMPLEMENTATION   2 4 6 12 4,17 
FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE 1   1 6 16 4,50 
CONSISTENT LEGISLATION     2 9 13 4,46 
FREE MOVEMENT OF SERVICES   1 4 4 15 4,38 
  
IMPORTERS/IMPORTERS+EXPORTERS  
(15 COMPANIES) 
  
FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS     1 3 11 4,67 
MIN. BUREAUCRACY     1 4 10 4,60 
FREE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL     2 6 7 4,33 
RAPID IMPLEMENTATION     2 4 9 4,47 
FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE       7 8 4,53 
CONSISTENT LEGISLATION     1 6 8 4,47 
FREE MOVEMENT OF SERVICES     1 6 8 4,47 
  
GLOBAL - COMPANIES WITH TRADE PARTNERSHIP 
 (39 COMPANIES) 
  
FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS 0 0 3 7 29 4,67 
MIN. BUREAUCRACY 0 0 4 15 20 4,41 
FREE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL 0 1 9 13 16 4,13 
RAPID IMPLEMENTATION 0 2 6 10 21 4,28 
FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE 1 0 1 13 24 4,51 
CONSISTENT LEGISLATION 0 0 3 15 21 4,46 
FREE MOVEMENT OF SERVICES 0 1 5 10 23 4,41 
  
COMPANIES WITHOUT COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP 
 (48 COMPANIES) 
  
FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS   2 5 14 27 4,12 
MIN. BUREAUCRACY   5 7 15 21 3,84 
FREE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL   2 11 17 17 3,73 
RAPID IMPLEMENTATION   2 12 15 18 3,73 
FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE   1 6 12 29 4,18 
CONSISTENT LEGISLATION   3 10 15 20 3,84 
FREE MOVEMENT OF SERVICES   2 5 18 23 4,04 
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C. SPSS Results  
 
- T-Test: Exporters vs. IIE 
 
- T-Test: Companies with trade vs. Companies without trade with the UK 
